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THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON THE
FAILURE OF MEDIATION
J. Michael Greig*
INTRODUCTION
Since its beginning in March 2011, the conflict in Syria has
produced considerable human suffering and increased the risk of
greater regional instability. The conflict has produced in excess of
35,000 fatalities and displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrians. 1
Violence against civilians has brought widespread condemnation
from across the international community. This violence, in turn, has
also increased calls for action to stop the fighting in Syria and protect
its civilian population.
To this end, a wide array of sanctions has been imposed upon
the Syrian government by actors including the United States,
members of the European Union, the Arab League, and regional
powers such as Turkey. The United Nations Security Council has
been sharply divided on how to deal with the crisis, with the United
States, Great Britain, and France calling for tougher language and
action against the Assad regime, and Russia and China in opposition.
Despite this lack of unanimity on the Security Council, U.N.
* J. Michael Greig, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of
North Texas.
1 See CNN Staff, By the Numbers: Syria Deaths, CNN.COM, Jan. 9, 2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/08/world/meast/syria-civil-war-compare/index.ht
ml; VDC: CENTER FOR DOCUMENTATION OF VIOLATIONS IN SYRIA,
http://www.vdc-sy.org/index.php/en/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).

48

2013

Greig

2:1

Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appointed former U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan as U.N.-Arab League Joint Special Envoy on
Syria in February 2012. Efforts to mediate the Syrian conflict are
consistent with the broader tendency of mediation to be applied to
the most difficult conflicts in the international system.2 Despite
Annan’s presentation of a plan to end the conflict and the dispatch in
April 2012 of a U.N. ceasefire monitoring mission, the Syrian conflict
has proven difficult to manage. A lasting ceasefire has proven elusive
among the belligerents, with conflict escalating sufficiently that
activities by the U.N. monitoring mission were suspended in June
2012 and its mandate went without renewal following its expiration.
Deteriorating conditions in August 2012 and the refusal of the Syrian
regime to negotiate led to the resignation of Kofi Annan, who was
subsequently replaced as U.N. envoy to Syria by Lakhdar Brahimi. In
his resignation, Annan laid blame for the failure of mediation at the
feet of both external powers as well as the warring sides themselves
stating, “without serious, purposeful and united international
pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is impossible for
me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place,
and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a
political process.”3
The inability of the United Nations or any other third party to
broker an end to the violence in Syria, despite early and frequent
demands by an array of outside powers for a cease-fire and the
dispatch of peace envoys and a U.N. monitoring force, raises the
question of why the Syrian conflict has proven so impervious to
settlement. Not only have third-party efforts to manage the conflict
been unsuccessful, but conditions have continued to deteriorate in
Syria with the level of violence mounting on both sides and civilian
suffering deepening. In this paper, I explore the ways in which some
of the insights from the scholarly conflict management literature can
be brought to bear in understanding the specific challenges faced by
2 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to
Fail but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 27 (2013).
3 Rick Gladstone, Annan Steps Down as Peace Envoy and Cites Barriers in Syria
and the United Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2012 at A6,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/world/middleeast/annan-resigns-as-syriapeace-envoy.html?pagewanted=all.
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third-party efforts to manage the Syrian conflict. I argue that the
characteristics of the warring sides and the way in which fighting has
evolved between the Syrian government and rebels each play an
important role in the failure of conflict management.
NUMBER OF PARTIES
The number of parties involved in a conflict plays an
important role in the prospects for successful mediation. In general,
as the number of parties in a conflict grows, the chances for
mediation success dim. Increasing the number of parties involved in
conflict brings three problems for mediation. First, communications
become tougher as the number of parties involved in a conflict
increase.4 A mediator confronting a conflict involving several parties
faces the difficult task of coordinating communications among each
side while limiting the chances of miscommunications. Second,
increasing the number of parties involved in a conflict raises the risk
of spoilers for the peace process. Increasing the number of warring
actors also increases the number of interests at stake among the
parties, increasing the number of veto players5 and raising the risk
that one or more parties oppose a settlement agreed to by the others.
This can create spoilers who engage in violence to derail the peace
process until their own demands are met.6 Third, increasing the
number of players in a conflict also increases the possibility of
commitment problems for any settlement. Peace efforts in civil wars
are inherently susceptible to commitment problems in which, even if
an agreement can be reached, the lack of enforcement makes neither
side confident that the other will live up to the terms of the
agreement.7 Commitment problems are exacerbated as the number of
actors involved in a conflict grows because agreement monitoring
becomes more difficult and the chances of spoilers increases.

4 See J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION 104-105 (2012).
5 See David Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table? Veto Players and Peace
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).
6 See Desirée Nilsson, Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil
War Settlements, 45 J. PEACE RES. 479, 481-82 (2008).
7 See Barbara F. Walter, Bargaining Failures and Civil War, 12 AM. REV.
POL. SCI. 243, 254 (2009).
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In this respect, the Syrian conflict presents a difficult
challenge for third parties seeking to mediate it. Because the rebels
are divided among a large number of groups, each with different
goals and backgrounds, it is difficult to simply identify all of the
actors needed to participate in any potential peace process. Although
the Free Syrian Army provides a unified name to much of the armed
Syrian opposition, this unity is limited. The Free Syrian Army is, at
best, a very loose collection of militia groups with minimal
coordination among one another.8 Foreign supporters of the Syrian
opposition have sought to encourage the development of a broad
coalition group to bring the rebels under one political umbrella. The
Syrian National Council was an early effort at unity, but it proved
difficult to coordinate with the Free Syrian Army, and struggled with
major divisions among constituent groups. The new National
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces is another
effort to unify the Syrian rebels, but its prospects for success remain
uncertain.9
INTENSITY AND DURATION OF VIOLENCE
Just as the characteristics of the warring sides shape the
chances for effective mediation, a large body of scholarly literature
points to the way in which a conflict unfolds over time as a key
influence on the chances that diplomatic efforts will be fruitful. 10
While some civil conflicts at their outset may inherently be more or
less susceptible to successful conflict management efforts, what takes
place on the battlefield over the course of the conflict shapes the
incentives for warring sides to accept mediation and make the
8

See Rania Abouzeid, Syria’s Secular and Islamist Rebels: Who are the Saudis
and the Qataris Arming?, TIME, Sep. 18, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/
09/18/syrias-secular-and-islamist-rebels-who-are-the-saudis-and-the-qatarisarming/.
9
See Jonathan Masters, Syria’s Crisis and the Global Response, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-crisisglobal-response/p28402.
10 See, e.g., Dean Pruitt, Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks, 2 INT’L
NEGOTIATIONS 237 (1997); J. Michael Greig, Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing
Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation Between Enduring Rivals, 45 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 691 (2001); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND
INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1989).
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concessions for a settlement. As a result, some points in time during
a conflict present better opportunities for effective third-party
diplomacy than others.
One of the challenges in managing a civil conflict is that as
the level of violence among belligerents grows, it increases hostility
among the parties, encouraging even more violence in the future. 11
This process, in turn, closes off communication between warring
sides,12 increases the extent to which the parties see themselves as
victims of the other,13 and encourages the belligerents to frame their
goals in terms of punishing the other side.14 Put together, increasing
levels of violence undermine the likelihood and effectiveness of
mediation efforts in managing the conflict.
The intensity of violence in Syria directly cuts against thirdparty efforts to manage the conflict and locate a settlement. When
mediation is applied to a civil war immediately following a spike in
battle deaths, the chances that talks will produce an agreement among
the combatants is sharply reduced.15 This is precisely the pattern that
casualty levels in Syria have followed. From June 2012 to August
2012, the number of Syrian casualties increased sharply, growing
from 2204 deaths in June to 5037 killed in August.16 Rising casualty
levels in Syria have made it harder for third-party efforts to manage
the conflict.
See ZARTMAN, supra note 10, at 263.
See Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson & Donette L. Wille,
Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in
International Relations, 28 J. PEACE RES. 7, 13 (1991); THOMAS PRINCEN,
INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 54-59 (1992).
13 See generally STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL
WAR (Cambridge University Press 2006) (1964).
14 See Dean Pruitt & Paul Olczak, Beyond Hope: Approaches to Resolving
Seemingly Intractable Conflict, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS
INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF MORTON DEUTSCH 59 (Barbara Bunker & Jeffrey
Rubin eds., 1995).
15 J. Michael Greig, Rebels at the Gates: Civil War Battle Locations, Movement,
and Openings for Mediation, paper presented at the 2012 Meeting of the Folke
Bernadotte Academy Conflict Prevention Working Group, State College, PA, 2012.
16 David Kenner, Syria Is More Violent Than Iraq at Its Worst, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Sept. 11, 2012, 10:27AM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09
/10/syria_is_more_violent_than_iraq_at_its_worst.
11
12
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Although rising casualty levels diminish the chances for
mediated agreement, the conflict management literature points to
another window for effective third-party diplomacy that is relevant to
Syria. While warring sides build up animosity and become less willing
to compromise the more they fight, at some point, as the two sides
build up more conflict costs, belligerents begin to seek an alternative
to fighting.17 As these costs grow for the belligerents, with neither
able to overcome the other and suffering increasing for each, a
hurting stalemate emerges.18 The development of this hurting
stalemate during a conflict creates a second window of opportunity
for mediation to end the fighting. Fundamental to the hurting
stalemate is that both sides must feel unacceptably painful conflict
costs and each must perceive that it cannot win the conflict and impose
its own terms of settlement. When a hurting stalemate develops, civil
war combatants become more open to mediation and grow more
willing to make the concessions necessary for a settlement.
What does this mean for Syria? Despite the deepening
suffering among the Syrian populace and the worsening level of
violence, there is little indication that Syria has developed sufficiently
into a hurting stalemate that settlement is likely. Although the level of
conflict is high, there is no evidence that it is unbearably so for either
side. At the same time, there is also nothing to suggest that either side
believes that it cannot ultimately prevail in the conflict and impose its
own terms without negotiation. Civil war research suggests that the
chances for mediation success only begin to approach the odds of
success that exist early in a civil conflict after fighting has continued
for 130 months and 33,000 battle-deaths have resulted, a level well
above where the Syrian conflict is.19 In this respect, Syria finds itself
in a nether zone of conflict. The warring sides have fought long
enough to become so hostile that there is little, if any, trust between
them and dialogue among the belligerents has become virtually
17 See J. Michael Greig & Patrick Regan, When Do They Say Yes? An
Analysis of the Willingness to Offer & Accept Mediation in Civil Wars, 52 INT’L STUD. Q.
759 (2008).
18 See I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225 (Paul C.
Stern & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000).
19 Greig, supra note 15.
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impossible. At the same time, the history of conflict has yet to reach
a sufficiently painful, stalemated point that the parties become open
to a settlement. From the perspective of a mediator, Syria finds itself
in the worst of all possible worlds.
GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Beyond the intensity and duration of violence, where fighting
between rebel and government forces occurs also significantly
impacts the success of mediation. This has direct implications for the
conflict in Syria. One of the challenges that a rebel force challenging
a government faces is demonstrating its ability to mount a credible,
durable threat to the regime. If a government anticipates that the
rebels can be quickly defeated or doubts the ability of the rebels to
impose significant costs on the regime, there is little reason for the
regime to negotiate with the rebels. To push governments to the
bargaining table, rebels must demonstrate their ability to impose
unacceptable costs on the regime. One way for rebels to do this is to
mount a military threat to a country’s major cities. In doing so, rebels
can disrupt important economic, social, and political activity for the
country. This can increase pressure from the populace on the
government to negotiate with the rebels.
As Syrian rebels increased their ability to threaten the
government across broader swaths of territory, their ability to impose
costs on the government also increased. As protests spread from
Dara’a to Homs and Aleppo, important industrial and financial
centers, the Syrian government began to signal their willingness to
make some limited concessions. At this point, however, these
concessions were not sufficient to stop the violence from deepening
and appeared more tactical than sincere. This points to a particular
challenge faced in managing civil conflicts. Conditions that might
encourage one side to offer concessions can encourage the other to
resist settlement with the expectation of better terms from fighting
than talking. As rebels see more success on the battlefield, they tend
to increase their demands on the government during talks. When
these increased demands are unacceptable for the regime, diplomatic
efforts become more likely to fail.
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The best example of this tendency for rising expectations of
victory to influence mediation is the effect that civil war battles
fought near the capital exert. Rather than increasing the likelihood of
agreement, the closer civil war battles occur to the capital, the less
likely mediation is to take place at all and, when it does occur, the less
likely it is to be successful.20 These diminished prospects for
mediation are a function of the distinct effects that such battles have
on both rebels and governments. For rebels, as their ability to sustain
a challenge near the capital grows, they increasingly see better
prospects for victories. As a result, rebels tend to increase their
demands on the regime in any settlement talks.21 A government
facing rebels near the capital is likely to see continued fighting as
preferable to agreement. First, such a government may see the
potential demands from the rebels as likely to be unacceptable to the
regime, potentially demanding terms such as the complete removal of
government officials. Second, even a government interested in
reaching a settlement may conclude that it can get better terms if it is
able to push the rebels away from the capital.
The way the dynamics of the Syrian conflict changed in July
2012 as rebel attacks began on the capital is consistent with this line
of thinking. The mounting violence in the capital not only imposed
real costs on the Syrian regime, but also carried important
psychological costs as well. Neil MacFarquhar argues that keeping
violence away from Damascus had an important effect on the Syrian
psyche, suggesting that protecting Damascus from threat “became a
kind of a psychological yardstick: if Damascus remained under
control, it meant the Assad government was still in control.”22 As
these attacks on the capital mounted, rather than offering
concessions or embracing diplomacy, the Assad regime adopted
increasingly aggressive measures, using air strikes against rebel
positions in Aleppo and Damascus and shelling Damascus
neighborhoods where rebel forces were believed to be located. In this
See id.
See Halvard Buhaug & Jan Ketil Rød, Local Determinants of African Civil
Wars, 1970–2001, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 315 (2006).
22 Neil MacFarquhar, Damascus Confronts New Reality After Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A13, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/
world/middleeast/bombing-attack-shifts-equation-in-syria-uprising.html?_r=0.
20
21
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respect, Jeffrey White, former senior Middle East analyst for the
Defense Intelligence Agency, argues that “There will not be any
negotiations . . . . He [Assad] will go down fighting, and he will
probably do it in Damascus.”23
CONCLUSION
The Syrian conflict has seen a variety of third-party efforts
from individual states, the Arab League, and the United Nations to
manage the conflict and find a settlement. Thus far, the conflict has
proven intractable. Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s
lament about the lack of purposive and unified action by the
international community toward Syria explains some of this conflict
management failure. Others have laid some of the blame at the feet
of the decisions made by those who have attempted to mediate the
conflict. Yet, what we know about conflict management points to
characteristics of the Syrian conflict that make it inherently difficult
to resolve diplomatically. The characteristics of the parties and how
they have fought each shape the effectiveness of conflict
management even before the mediators arrive.

Joby Warrick & Anne Gearan, For Syria’s Assad Only Exit May Be a Body
Bag, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2012, at A01, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 201207-31/world/35486777_1_syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-aleppo-troops-battlerebels.
23
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